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“IF THAT’S THE WAY IT MUST BE, OKAY”1: 
CAMPBELL V. ACUFF-ROSE ON REWIND 
THOMAS IRVIN* 
The 1994 Supreme Court case Campbell v. Acuff-Rose established 
broad protections for parody in U.S. copyright law.  While the case is well 
known, the facts behind the case are not.  None of the three courts that 
heard the case were told that the alleged parody by 2 Live Crew appeared 
only on a “sanitized” version of the group’s controversial album.  Thus the 
work had a heightened commercial purpose: filling up a meager album so 
that album could serve as a market stopgap for its controversial cousin.  
Although commercial purpose is a key factor in the fair use calculus, no 
court heard this argument. 
The case is also ironic because Acuff-Rose maintained that 2 Live 
Crew’s song was by definition not a parody in the first place, but was 
unable to argue this due to procedural maneuvers in the district court and 
due to the Sixth Circuit’s desire to address fair use in a music context.  
Furthermore, 2 Live Crew’s expert Oscar Brand demonstrated a deep 
misunderstanding of the rap genre, and his analysis essentially relegates rap 
artists to participants in a minstrel show.  Ironically, that was the winning 
argument for a black rap artist.  In short, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose is a case 
that came out wrong—wonderfully wrong. 
                                                          
 *J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2007; B.A, University of 
Nebraska–Lincoln, 2004.  The author would like to thank professors Raymond Ku and Jonathan 
Entin at Case Western Reserve University School of Law for their assistance, and Dr. Laura 
Hengehold at Case Western Reserve University, department of Philosophy, for her insight into 
Dadaist art. 
  
1.  ROY ORBISON, OH, PRETTY WOMAN (Monument Records 1964). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Songs are gifts, you know; they’re blessings that just sort of 
drop in your lap. 
 
–Roy Orbison, Singer-Songwriter and Musician2 
 
The Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc.3 was hailed as a “major victory” for free speech and those who make 
their living from commercial parodies.4  The acclaim for the outcome of the 
case is well-deserved.  But, remarkably, that outcome is not supported by 
the facts of the case and the songs in question. 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose is a parody case that, as this article argues, 
does not involve parody, and a case about commerciality in which the 
courts (and likely the plaintiff) underappreciated the commerciality of the 
work at issue.  Resolution of the issues in Campbell should not have 
required a decision by the district court, let alone a trip to the Supreme 
Court.  But it is a case that illustrates the legal system’s difficulty in 
grappling with new forms of art, and a case that demonstrates that the race 
of the artist affects people’s perceptions of art. 
It is a case that prompted 2 Live Crew’s attorney to remark, “it is easy 
to see why many people believe that Luther Campbell and 2 Live Crew 
make better law than music,”5 and a case that Acuff-Rose’s attorney called 
“probably the first copyright case that can be decided on the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur.”6  Indeed, this should have been a case that speaks for itself.  
But few of the judges who presided over the hearings (save perhaps Justice 
Kennedy, who concurred with the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision 
but felt the work had limited parodic content) understood what was really 
                                                          
2.  ROY ORBISON, INTERVIEW CD WITH Q&A (Orbison Records 1997). 
 
3.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Campbell III), 510 U.S. 569 (1994).   
 
4.  Aaron Epstein, A Rap Ruling: Parody is Protected, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 8, 1994, at 
A1. 
 
5.  Bruce Rogow, The Art of Making Law from Other People’s Art, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 127, 127 (1996). 
 
6.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Campbell III, 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292). 
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underlying the arguments.  In short, it is a landmark case that came out 
wrong—wonderfully wrong. 
The odd chain of circumstances that led to the Supreme Court began 
simply enough.  Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (“Acuff-Rose”), owner of the 
copyright to the Roy Orbison classic “Oh, Pretty Woman,” sued the rap 
band 2 Live Crew, their leader Luther Campbell, and Campbell’s self-
owned record label for copyright infringement.7  2 Live Crew had sampled 
the classic guitar riff from the Orbison original8 (although the case was not 
about sampling) and built a new song, dropping the “Oh” and calling theirs 
simply “Pretty Woman.” 
After being sued for copyright infringement in the Middle District of 
Tennessee, 2 Live Crew argued the affirmative defense of fair use, 
claiming their work was a parody, and moved for summary judgment.9  
The district court granted 2 Live Crew’s motion (finding their work was 
both a parody and a fair use), and Acuff-Rose appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.10  In a 2-1 decision, the Sixth Circuit 
accepted the district court’s finding that the work was a parody, but held 
that its “blatantly commercial purpose” precluded a finding of fair use.11 
The basis of the Sixth Circuit’s decision was that commercial 
parodies are presumptively unfair.  Because this was in conflict with 
rulings from other circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether a commercial parody could be a fair use under copyright 
law.12  Justice Souter wrote for a unanimous court that parody in general 
could be protected under the fair use doctrine, and overturned the Sixth 
Circuit’s ruling that the commercial nature of “Pretty Woman” made it 
presumptively unfair.13  However, the Court stopped short of declaring that 
                                                          
7.  Complaint, Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell (Campbell I), 754 F. Supp. 1150 
(M.D. Tenn. 1991) (No. 3:90-0524). 
 
8.  STAN SOOCHER, THEY FOUGHT THE LAW: ROCK MUSIC GOES TO COURT 216 
(Schirmer Books 1999). 
 
9.  See Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 573. 
 
10.  Id. 
 
11.  Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell (Campbell II), 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 
1992). 
 
12.  Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 575, 579–80 (1994). 
 
13.  Id. at 579–81, 590–94. 
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this instance was a fair use, instead remanding to the district court for a 
fuller determination of facts on the third and fourth statutory fair use 
factors.14  Yet before further court actions could take place, the parties 
agreed that 2 Live Crew would pay for a retroactive license to use the 
Orbison song.15 
Admittedly, it is easy to play Monday morning quarterback with a 
case that has received as much attention as Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, and it 
should be noted that the briefs submitted by both sides in every court that 
heard the case were excellent overall.16  But important details relating to 
the music itself and how it was marketed have been absent from the briefs, 
the opinions, and the post-decision analyses, making it a fascinating case 
for a postmortem musical forensic analysis.17 
Part II of this article provides a biographical background of the 
parties.  Part III argues that “Pretty Woman” was more commercial than the 
plaintiff or the courts realized at the time, and as such should have received 
less deference in a fair use analysis.  Part IV examines Acuff-Rose’s 
attempts to convince the courts that the work was not a parody in the first 
place and suggests some explanations for why the courts had difficulty 
grasping this idea.  Part V demonstrates the considerable weight given by 
all three courts to the affidavit of well-known folk singer Oscar Brand, 
despite Brand’s profound misunderstanding of the rock and rap genres.  
Part V also examines how the races of the participants may have influenced 
the fair use calculus.  Part VI concludes. 
For purposes of this article, the Middle District of Tennessee case will 
be referred to as Campbell I, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit case 
as Campbell II, and the Supreme Court case as Campbell III.18 
                                                          
14.  Id. at 599–600 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 
15.  SOOCHER, supra note 8, at 189–90. 
 
16.  See generally Brief on the Merits for Respondent, Campbell III, 510 U.S. 569 (No. 
92-1292); Brief on the Merits for Petitioners, Campbell III, 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292); Brief for 
Appellant, Campbell II, 972 F.2d 1429 (No. 91-6225); Appellees’ Brief at 40, Campbell II, 972 
F.2d 1429 (No. 91-6225). 
 
17.  See, e.g., Rogow, supra note 5; Nels Jacobson, Note, Faith, Hope & Parody: 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, “Oh, Pretty Woman,” and Parodists’ Rights, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 955 
(1994); Matthew H. Schwartz, On Target with the Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement, 26 
BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS’N J. 57 (1992); Robert B. O’Connor, Comment, Rap Parodies?: An In-
depth Look at Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 2 FORDHAM ENT. MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. 
L.F. 239 (1992). 
 
18.  Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), rev’d, 
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II. BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PARTIES 
Name me a song that everybody knows 
And I’ll bet you it belongs to Acuff-Rose 
 
–Uncle Tupelo, “Acuff-Rose”19 
A. Roy Orbison 
Roy Orbison, lionized in death by Paul McCartney as “one of the 
greats of Rock ’n’ Roll,”20 was born in Vernon, Texas in 1936, and was 
given his first guitar at the age of six.21  By the age of twenty he was 
recording for legendary Sun Records impresario Sam Phillips (who 
launched the careers of Elvis Presley, Jerry Lee Lewis, and Carl Perkins), 
but aside from one hit, his Sun Records years yielded little success.22 
In 1960, Orbison signed with Monument Records, and from 1960 to 
1964 his recordings “brought a new splendor to rock” with their 
sophisticated production, blending “a little bit of everything: Latin rhythms, 
martial beats, reminiscences of classical music, [and] keening steel 
guitars.”23  Orbison’s biggest hits are from this period and include “Only 
                                                          
972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).  Many references to the briefs 
submitted by the parties in the three courts appear in this article.  Citations are to the sources most 
likely to be found by the casual reader; therefore references to briefs from the parties in Campbell 
III are to the original page numbers, which are available on Westlaw.  Briefs from Campbell II 
are to the original page numbers, however these briefs (as of this writing) are only available on 
request (with a fee) from the Sixth Circuit.  References to briefs in Campbell I are to the page 
numbers in the Joint Appendix accompanying the Supreme Court case (which is widely available 
on microfilm), the page numbers of which are followed by an a, such as 32a.  Other disparate 
documents, such as affidavits from Campbell I and the denial of rehearing en banc from the Sixth 
Circuit, are also part of this Joint Appendix, therefore references to these documents are also to 
their page number in the Joint Appendix.  Briefs for the amici in Campbell II are also available on 
microfilm but are not part of the Joint Appendix; each of these briefs are numbered independently 
and references to these are by name of amici party and original page number. 
 
19.  UNCLE TUPELO, Acuff-Rose, on ANODYNE (Sire Records 1993). 
 
20.  David Zimmerman, Roy Orbison: He Struck a Chord with the Lonely, U.S.A. TODAY, 
Dec. 8, 1988, at D1. 
 
21.  Ken Emerson, Roy Orbison, in THE ROLLING STONE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF 
ROCK & ROLL 129, 129 (Jim Miller ed., Rolling Stone Press 1980) (1976). 
 
22.  Id. at 129–30. 
 
23.  Id. at 130. 
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the Lonely” (#2 in 1960), “Running Scared” (#1 in 1961), and “Crying” 
(#2 in 1961).24  In 1964, he had his final #1 hit with “Oh, Pretty Woman,” 
co-written with his friend William “Bill” Dees.25 
After 1964, Orbison’s string of hit singles dried up.  But he continued 
to record and perform, even after losing his wife to a motorcycle accident 
in 1966 and two of his three children to a house fire in 1968.26  Orbison 
enjoyed a late-career resurgence with his involvement in the supergroup the 
Traveling Wilburys, featuring Orbison, Bob Dylan, George Harrison, Tom 
Petty, and Jeff Lynne.  Unfortunately it was short-lived.  He died of a heart 
attack on December 6, 1988—just six months before the release of 2 Live 
Crew’s version of his biggest hit.27 
B. Acuff-Rose 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (“Acuff-Rose”) is a music publishing 
company that began in 1942 as an outlet for “King of Country Music” Roy 
Acuff’s growing career as a songwriter.28  Formed in Nashville with 
$25,000 in seed money from Acuff (and his song catalog), the company 
was run primarily by Acuff’s business partner Fred Rose and then by 
Rose’s son Wesley Rose after his death in 1954.29  The company was the 
first music publisher dedicated to country music, scoring major country hits 
with “I’m So Lonesome I Could Cry,” “Big Bad John,” “Tennessee 
Waltz,” “Release Me,” and “I Can’t Stop Loving You.”30  In the late 1950s 
Acuff-Rose also achieved success in the nascent rock ’n’ roll market with 
the songs of the Everly Brothers (“Cathy’s Clown”) and Felice and 
Boudleaux Bryant, the husband-wife duo who wrote many of the Everlys’ 
hits: “Bye Bye Love,” “All I Have To Do Is Dream,” and “Wake Up Little 
                                                          
24.  Id. at 130–31.  All chart positions are from the Billboard Pop chart. 
 
25.  Id. at 131; ROY ORBISON, OH, PRETTY WOMAN (Monument Records 1964). 
 
26.  THE ROLLING STONE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ROCK & ROLL 407–08 (Jon Pareles & 
Patricia Romanowski eds., 1st ed. Rolling Stone Press 1983). 
 
27.  Zimmerman, supra note 20. 
 
28.  See BARRY MCCLOUD, DEFINITIVE COUNTRY: THE ULTIMATE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COUNTRY MUSIC AND ITS PERFORMERS 3 (Perigee 1995). 
 
29.  Id. at 3–4. 
 
30.  Id. at 4. 
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Susie.”31  Despite these early Rock ’n’ Roll successes (and the songs of 
Roy Orbison), the company was largely dedicated to country music, and 
Opryland USA acquired its 20,000 copyrights in 1985.32 
C. 2 Live Crew 
2 Live Crew is a four-man rap ensemble from the Liberty City 
neighborhood of Miami, which first rose to fame in the late 1980s on the 
strength of raunchy tunes and the do-it-yourself business savvy of band 
leader and label head Luther Campbell, also known as Luke Skyywalker.33  
Campbell founded Skyywalker Records34 (“Skyywalker”) to distribute the 
group’s material and sold 200,000 copies of the group’s first single, 
“Throw the D.”35  Other successes followed with the albums The 2 Live 
Crew Is What We Are (1986) and Move Somethin’ (1987),36 and so too did 
the legal attention for the group’s vulgar songs.37  In 1987, a Florida record 
store clerk was arrested for selling a copy of the 2 Live Crew’s debut 
album to a minor, though those charges were later dropped.38  In 1988, in 
what lawyers called the first obscenity conviction for recorded music, an 
Alabama record storeowner was convicted for selling Move Somethin’ to 
an undercover police officer.39  Despite the negative attention (or perhaps 
                                                          
31.  Id.; THE NEW ROLLING STONE ALBUM GUIDE 287 (Nathan Brackett & Christian 
Hoard eds., 4th ed. Simon & Schuster 2004) (1979). 
 
32.  MCCLOUD, supra note 28, at 4. 
 
33.  THE NEW ROLLING STONE ALBUM GUIDE, supra note 31, at 829. 
 
34.  See Maya Bell, ‘I’m Here to Make Money’ Raunch = Profits for 2 Live Crew’s Luke 
Skyywalker, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 8, 1990, at E1.  Campbell derived his stage name Luke 
Skyywalker from the famous Star Wars character and added an extra “y” in an effort to avoid 
legal hassles from Star Wars creator George Lucas.  Bruce Rogow, The Art of Making Law from 
Other People’s Art, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 127, 128 n.4 (1996).  For the purposes of this 
article, all references to Luke Skyywalker the person will be by his given name, Luther Campbell, 
and the name Skyywalker will be reserved for the record company. 
 
35.  See Bell, supra note 34.  
 
36.  THE NEW ROLLING STONE ALBUM GUIDE, supra note 31, at 829. 
 
37.  See Eric Snider, A “Nasty” Situation Critics Seem Intent on Cleaning Up 2 Live 
Crew, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Mar. 23, 1990, at 1D. 
  
38.  Id.  
 
39.  Id. 
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because of it), a July 1989 article in the weekly trade publication and 
record industry bible Billboard called Campbell “probably the most 
successful independent record maker in recent memory.”40  The article was 
published just as 2 Live Crew released the companion albums As Nasty As 
They Wanna Be (“Nasty”) and As Clean As They Wanna Be (“Clean”), 
which would bring Campbell and the group both their greatest success and 
enormous legal hassles.41 
III. NASTY AND CLEAN: ACUFF-ROSE’S BEST ARGUMENT  
THAT NOBODY HEARD 
I’m here to make money.  The Lord didn’t put me here for no 




In Campbell III, Justice Souter opined that if the claimed fair use 
work was used “to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up 
something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s work 
diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the 
extent of its commerciality, loom larger.”43  Although a fair statement in 
the abstract, it is not in harmony with the music of 2 Live Crew’s “Pretty 
Woman,” which owes its very existence to commerciality and “avoid[ing] 
the drudgery in working up something fresh.”44 
A. Contextualizing 2 Live Crew’s Use of the Orbison Original 
1. Commerciality of the Work 
To appreciate just how commercial “Pretty Woman” is, one must look 
to the context of 2 Live Crew’s companion albums Nasty and Clean.  Nasty 
features eighteen tracks, nearly all of which manage to be simultaneously 
                                                          
40.  Thom Duffy, Seminar Faces Up to Rock’N’Roll Sexism; Stones Roll; Poco Picks Up 
the Pieces, BILLBOARD, July 22, 1989, at 34. 
 
41.  See id. 
 
42.  Maya Bell, ‘I’m Here to Make Money’ Raunch = Profits for 2 Live Crew’s Luke 
Skyywalker, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 8, 1990, at E1. 
 
43.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Campbell III), 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994). 
 
44.  See infra Part III.A. 
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puerile, misogynistic, and generally vulgar.45  The Southern District of 
Florida went so far as to declare the album legally obscene in June of 
1990,46 but the Eleventh Circuit reversed this ruling in May of 1992.47  Of 
Nasty’s eighteen tracks, seven were “cleaned up” enough to appear on the 
companion album Clean.48  Presumably the other eleven tracks, with titles 
such as “Dick Almighty,” “The Fuck Shop,” “Bad Ass Bitch,” and “Get 
The Fuck Out Of My House,” were so fundamentally unredeemable that 
they could not be cleaned up; hence, three additional non-vulgar songs 
were added to bring Clean to a total of ten songs.49  “Pretty Woman” was 
among these three.50  The other nine songs on Clean are credited to “Luke 
Skyywalker and the 2 Live Crew,” while “Pretty Woman” gives 
songwriting credit to Orbison and Dees and publishing credit to Acuff-
Rose.51 
Around the time of the albums’ release, and in response to community 
pressures, retail outlets had been objecting to product with controversial 
lyrics, titles, and/or artwork.52  With retail concerns about objectionable 
content in mind, Skyywalker Records sought input in selecting the cover 
art and showed its distributors three possible cover pictures for the 
companion albums to determine what would be acceptable to retailers.53  
The ultimate solution was for both albums to have nearly identical cover 
art, but on Clean, the four nearly-nude women pictured have their thong 
bikini bottoms covered by an opaque bar reading, “THIS ALBUM DOES 
NOT CONTAIN EXPLICIT LYRICS.”54 
                                                          
45.  See generally Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 
1990), rev’d Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 
46.  Id. 
 
47.  Id. 
 
48.  2 LIVE CREW, AS CLEAN AS THEY WANNA BE (Skyywalker Records 1989) 
[hereinafter 2 LIVE CREW, CLEAN]. 
 
49.  Id.; 2 LIVE CREW, AS NASTY AS THEY WANNA BE (Skyywalker Records 1989) 
[hereinafter 2 LIVE CREW, NASTY]. 
 
50.  2 LIVE CREW, CLEAN, supra note 48. 
 
51.  Id.  
 
52.  Bruce Haring, It’s An Artist’s Affair, Say Labels On Censorship Pressures, 
BILLBOARD, July 8, 1989, at 79. 
 
53.  Id. 
 
54.  2 LIVE CREW, CLEAN, supra note 48. 
ELR - IRVIN (FINALX6) (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2016  2:02 PM 
146 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:2 
Skyywalker’s concerns about accommodating retail proved prescient.  
In March of 1990, approximately nine months after the albums’ release, 
publicity surrounding the legal obscenity of Nasty caused retailers to 
react.55  The St. Petersburg Times reported, “Most major [record store] 
chains . . . have pulled [Nasty] from the shelves,”56 and the Los Angeles 
Times reported that Musicland/Sam Goody (the nation’s largest chain at the 
time, with 752 stores) had ordered all its outlets to stop selling Nasty—but 
not Clean.57  A Skyywalker spokesperson stated, “Obviously we’re not 
pleased, but we can understand where they’re coming from.  No retailers 
want to take too much heat over this and we don’t want them to.”58  Clean, 
containing “Pretty Woman,” remained on sale, and three months later 
(almost a year after the albums were released and after approximately 
250,000 copies of Clean had been sold),59 Acuff-Rose sued the members of 
2 Live Crew and Skyywalker Records for copyright infringement of “Oh, 
Pretty Woman.”60  In response, the defendants argued its “Pretty Woman” 
is a parody of the original that constitutes fair use under section 107 of the 
Copyright Act of 1976.61 
“From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair 
use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill 
copyright’s very purpose, ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.’”62  The fair use exception, codified in section 107, limits the 
exclusive rights of a copyright owner and provides that the fair use of a 
                                                          
55.  See Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 598 (finding “a direct relationship between 
the sheriffs’ visits and the surrounding publicity on the one hand, and the store operators’ 
decision to remove Nasty from their shelves on the other”).  The Skyywalker Records case arose 
after south Florida music retailers received warnings of a judicial order in which the county 
circuit court had found probable cause that the Nasty recording was legally obscene.  Id. at 583 
(“The Sheriff’s office warnings [that future sales would result in arrest] were very effective.”). 
 
56.  Eric Snider, A “Nasty” Situation Critics Seem Intent on Cleaning Up 2 Live Crew, 
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Mar. 23, 1990, at 1D. 
 
57.  Steve Hochman, Record Chain Clears Shelves Of Rap Album, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 
1990, at F1. 
 
58.  Id. at F21. 
 
59.  Skyywalker Records, 739 F. Supp. at 582. 
 
60.  Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell (Campbell I), 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1151–52 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1991). 
 
61.  Id. at 1152 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982)). 
 
62.  Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 575 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
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copyrighted work for purposes such as criticism or comment is not an 
infringement of copyright.63  While section 107 does not directly address 
parody, “courts have readily applied the fair use defense to parodies by 
finding that parodies constitute a criticism of or comment on a copyrighted 
work.”64  In determining whether a given use of a copyrighted work is fair, 
section 107 instructs courts to balance at least four factors: 
 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.65 
2. Commerciality of the Work as Argued Before the Courts 
As outlined in the introduction, the district court concluded 2 Live 
Crew’s “Pretty Woman” to be a parody that constitutes protected fair use; 
the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the fair use finding and reversed the grant 
of summary judgment; and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, but 
the parties settled on a license before the district court could revisit the 
issue.66  All three courts gave considerable space to discussions of the 
importance of the commerciality of the work, which is part of the first 
statutory fair use factor, “purpose and character of the use.”67  One would 
expect Acuff-Rose to point out that “Pretty Woman” was recorded for an 
album whose purpose and character was to fill the market niche cast by the 
shadow of its nastier cousin, given that 2 Live Crew had a history of having 
problems at retail.  This would have established an even more “blatantly 
commercial purpose” than any other musical work on the market.  But no 
                                                          
63.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 
64.  Kathryn D. Piele, Three Years After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.: What is 
Fair Game for Parodists?, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 75, 78 (1997). 
 
65.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 
66.  Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), rev’d, 
972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 
67.  Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012). 
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mention of this is made in any of the three Campbell opinions, despite the 
fact that the hoopla surrounding the Nasty album predated the initial suit by 
Acuff-Rose.68 
Indeed, even with all the attention paid to the Supreme Court’s 
decision by legal scholars and to 2 Live Crew in the popular press, very 
few in the legal world have more than a passing familiarity with the 
musical output of 2 Live Crew.  A March 2016 search of Westlaw revealed 
only four law review articles that mention both Clean and Nasty in the 
context of “Pretty Woman,” one of which was written by Bruce Rogow, 
who was 2 Live Crew’s attorney.69  Two other law review articles 
incorrectly state that “Pretty Woman” appears on the more popular, and 
more infamous, Nasty.70 
In sum, the heightened commerciality of “Pretty Woman” on Clean is 
evinced when properly contextualizing the album as a dual release with—
and only because of—Nasty.  Although surveyed executives at the time 
said there was “no discernible trend toward dual releases on controversial 
product,” separate artwork and edited versions of controversial songs had 
been issued by record labels on several occasions, no doubt wary of 
accommodating retail proprieties.71  2 Live Crew’s use of the Orbison song 
was a mere shortcut to get sellable product into a market sympathetic to the 
concerns of its prude audiences. 
B. Procedural History and What Could Have Been 
Acuff-Rose’s initial complaint in the district court does mention the 
fact that Nasty and Clean were released on the same date, and that Clean 
                                                          
68.  See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), 
rev’d, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 510 U.S. 569 (1994); see also 2 LIVE CREW, NASTY, 
supra note 49. 
 
69.  Wayne M. Cox, Note, Rhymin’ and Stealin’? The History of Sampling in the Hip-Hop 
and Dance Music Worlds and How U.S. Copyright Law and Judicial Precedent Serves to Shackle 
Art, 14 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 219, 230 & n.65 (2015); Bruce Rogow, The Art of Making Law 
From Other People’s Art, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 127, 128 (1996); Nels Jacobson, Faith, 
Hope & Parody: Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., ‘Oh, Pretty Woman,’ and Parodists’ 
Rights, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 955, 981 (1994); Alan Korn, Comment, Renaming That Tune: Aural 
Collage, Parody and Fair Use, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 321, 359 n.214 (1992). 
 
70.  Matthew H. Schwartz, On Target with the Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement, 
26 BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS’N J. 57, 66 n.107 (1992); Robert B. O’Connor, Comment, Rap 
Parodies?: An In-depth Look at Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 2 FORDHAM ENT. MEDIA & 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 239, 239 (1992). 
 
71.  Haring, supra note 52. 
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contains six of the eighteen songs on Nasty.72  However, there was no need 
for Acuff-Rose to draw inferences of 2 Live Crew’s commercial purpose 
from this fact.  At that time, 2 Live Crew had not yet replied to the 
complaint with their affirmative defense of parody.  Acuff-Rose’s initial 
complaint merely claimed that the melody and lyrics, and not necessarily 
the sound recording since the case wasn’t about sampling, of 2 Live Crew’s 
“Pretty Woman” were substantially similar to those of Orbison’s “Oh, 
Pretty Woman,” and thus infringed their copyright.73  2 Live Crew 
defended its use on the basis of parody and filed a motion to dismiss, which 
was later converted to a motion for summary judgment.74  Acuff-Rose filed 
a response, addressing 2 Live Crew’s parody defense, but making no 
mention of Nasty or the heightened commercial purpose of “Pretty 
Woman,” and no further mention of Nasty was made in briefs from either 
party in any of the subsequent appeals (including amici in the Supreme 
Court).75 
Had Acuff-Rose briefed this issue, the Sixth Circuit still could have 
found for Acuff-Rose, but on different grounds.  This would have resulted 
in no circuit split and no trip to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court’s 
opinion stressed that there was no presumption that a commercial purpose 
required the parodist to lose on the first and fourth fair use factors, and it 
was on that ground that the Court overturned the Sixth Circuit.76  Had the 
Sixth Circuit heard the argument that “Pretty Woman” existed only to fill a 
market niche, the court likely would have found that its commercial use in 
                                                          
72.  Complaint at 18a, Campbell I, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (No. 3:90-0524).  The number of 
songs from Nasty that also appear on Clean is listed as being six, however an examination of the 
two albums shows seven tracks common to both: “C’mon Babe,” “Get Loose Now,” “Coolin’,” 
“Break It On Down,” “Me So Horny,” “My Seven Bizzos,” and “Mega Mixx III.”  Compare 2 
LIVE CREW, NASTY, supra note 49, with 2 LIVE CREW, CLEAN, supra note 48. 
 
73.  Campbell I, 754 F. Supp. at 1152.  Acuff-Rose also alleged two state law tort claims 
of interference with prospective business advantage and interference with business relations, 
which the court found on summary judgment to be preempted by federal copyright law under 17 
U.S.C. § 301.  Id. at 1159–60.  Acuff-Rose did not challenge the preemption determination on 
appeal.  Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell (Campbell II), 972 F.2d 1429, 1433 n.5 (6th Cir. 
1992). 
 
74.  See Motion to Dismiss at 29a, Campbell I, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (No. 3:90-0524); 
Motion to Convert Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss to Motion for Summary Judgment at 99a, 
Campbell I, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (No. 3:90-0524). 
 
75.  See Campbell III, 510 U.S. 569; Campbell II, 972 F.2d at 1432–33; Plaintiff’s 
Response to the Motion to Dismiss at 105a, 109a–113a, Campbell I, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (No. 
3:90-0524). 
 
76.  Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 594. 
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fact harmed the market, on the weight of the evidence, rather than applying 
a mere presumption.  Such a finding would have caused no inconsistencies 
with the other circuits and the Supreme Court would have likely not 
granted certiorari. 
In oral argument before the Supreme Court, Acuff-Rose’s counsel, 
Sidney Rosdeitcher,77 sounded as if he wanted to argue that 2 Live Crew’s 
use of the Orbison record on Clean was merely a shortcut to get sellable 
product into the market: “They profited here, in addition, because they 
needed music and they needed dazzling, good music, and they took one of 
the great rock and roll classics.”78  But Rosdeitcher may have in fact been 
unaware of the existence of Nasty, as he also mentioned that he purchased 
his copy of Clean at Sam Goody—where Nasty had already been pulled 
from the shelves.79  Rosdeitcher explained, “I originally bought this record 
when I was in the running for coming onto this case.  I went into Sam 
Goody and I went to the rap section and I pulled this off the shelf next to 2 
Live Crew’s other rap songs.”80 
It is hard to imagine a creative work with a more commercial purpose 
than filling out an otherwise meager “sanitized” album that serves as a 
market stopgap.  Yet, in finding that the use seen in Campbell is not 
presumptively unfair merely because it is a commercial use, the Supreme 
Court indicated that use of parody to advertise something else would be 
more commercial and “entitled to less indulgence under the first factor of 
the fair use inquiry than the sale of a parody for its own sake.”81  Given that 
Nasty outsold Clean ten to one,82 what is “Pretty Woman” doing on the 
Clean album but serving as a component in the marketing of the much 
more popular Nasty? 
                                                          
77.  Id. at 571.  When the case came before the Supreme Court, Acuff-Rose was 
represented by the New York firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, rather than King 
& Ballow of Nashville, who had handled the district court & Sixth Circuit cases. 
 
78.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Campbell III, 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292). 
 
79.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 78,. at 41. 
 
80.  Id. 
 
81.  Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 585. 
 
82.  Eric Snider, supra note 56. 
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C. Parody for Profit is Protected Fair Use, Probably 
While commercial parodies used in advertising are somewhat rare, at 
least one such case has gone to trial.83  In Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures 
Corp., renowned photographer Annie Leibovitz sued the makers of the 
movie Naked Gun 33 1/3: The Final Insult over a promotional poster that 
featured the head of actor Leslie Nielsen over a naked, pregnant body.84  
The body was very similar to a famous photo shot by Leibovitz of actress 
Demi Moore that appeared on the cover of Vanity Fair magazine.85  The 
district court held it was a fair use, and the Second Circuit affirmed, despite 
the statement in Campbell III that such a use—advertising another 
product—is entitled to less deference under the first fair use factor.86 
The Leibovitz case demonstrates just how powerful a finding of 
parody is to the fair use calculus after Campbell.  Although the Campbell 
III Court stressed that parody may or may not constitute fair use,87 in 
practice, a parody is almost certain to be found to be a fair use.88  In fact, 
since Campbell III, in every case in which the potentially infringing work 
was explicitly declared by the court to be a parody, that party has 
ultimately won (or at least prevented attempts by the other party to obtain 
an injunction) on a fair use defense, at either the district court or appellate 
levels.89  As one court pointed out in a post-Campbell case, because of the 
nature of parody, “once a work is determined to be a parody, the second, 
                                                          
83.  See Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 
137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 
84.  Id. at 1215. 
 
85.  Id. 
 
86.  Id. at 1226. 
 
87.  Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 581. 
 
88.  See e.g., Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); Leibovitz v. Paramount 
Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998); CCA and B, LLC v. F + W Media Inc., 819 F. Supp. 
2d 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2011); Bourne Co. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 602 F. Supp. 2d 499 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal. 
2007); MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6068(GBD), 2004 
WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004); Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 320 F. 
Supp. 2d 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t, Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 
F. Supp. 2d 413 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); 
Lyons P’shp, L.P. v. Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp. 2d 947 (N.D. Tex. 1998). 
 
89.  See cases cited supra note 88. 
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third, and fourth factors are unlikely to militate against a finding of fair 
use.”90 
IV: PROCEDURE, PURPOSE, AND APPROPRIATION: ACUFF-ROSE’S 
SECOND-BEST ARGUMENT THAT NOBODY HEARD 
I rhyme like an artist, such as DaVinci  
Like the Mona Lisa, I’m a sight to see 
 
–2 Live Crew, “Break It On Down”91 
 
A careful reading of the three Campbell decisions appears to indicate 
that Acuff-Rose challenged the status of “Pretty Woman” as a parody only 
at the district court level, then accepted the finding of parody and merely 
argued to the Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court that the parody was not a 
fair use.92  Examining the briefs, however, reveals otherwise.93  Acuff-Rose 
vigorously challenged both the rap song’s status as a parody to the district 
court and the manner in which it was found a parody to the Sixth Circuit,94 
but was prevented from arguing this to the Supreme Court due to the 
language limiting the scope of the question before the Court in its grant of 
                                                          
90.  See Abilene Music, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 89. 
 
91.  2 LIVE CREW, Break It On Down, on AS NASTY AS THEY WANNA BE (Skyywalker 
Records 1989). 
 
92.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Campbell III), 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc. v. Campbell (Campbell II), 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992); Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. 
Campbell (Campbell I), 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991). 
 
93.  See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Compel at 184a, Campbell I, 754 
F. Supp. 1150 (No. 3:90-0524) (requesting discovery relating to defendants’ use of “Oh, Pretty 
Woman” to create a derivative work, the willfulness of defendants’ infringement of plaintiff’s 
music and lyrics, and profits from the infringement); Plaintiff’s Response to the Motion to 
Dismiss at 109a–113a, Campbell I, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (No. 3:90-0524) (arguing 2 Live Crew’s 
assertion of parody is a conclusory afterthought that, moreover, does not comment on the 
copyrighted work). 
 
94.  See Brief for Appellant at 16–19, Campbell II, 972 F.2d 1429 (No. 91-6225) (arguing 
the trial court gave insufficient attention to the parody issue, resulting in a determination “flawed 
by its premature resolution of disputed facts and by its commingling of the parody determination 
with the four statutorily listed factors”); Plaintiff’s Response to the Motion to Dismiss, supra note 
93 (arguing 2 Live Crew’s assertion of parody is a conclusory afterthought that, moreover, does 
not comment on the copyrighted work). 
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certiorari.95  Acuff-Rose had always maintained that “Pretty Woman” was 
not parodic.96  In spite of their arguments however, and as this Part 
explains, the work’s parody status was sealed due to Acuff-Rose’s own 
plea for an instructive legal standard on musical parody and fair use. 
A. The District Court: Summary Judgment of Parody and Fair Use 
To understand how the narrow issue in Campbell III affected Acuff-
Rose’s litigation strategy, it is important to remember that Campbell I was 
decided on summary judgment.97  In their reply brief to 2 Live Crew’s 
motion for summary judgment, which first claimed the affirmative defense 
of parody, Acuff-Rose insisted that genuine issues of material fact 
remained as to whether “Pretty Woman” was a parody and a fair use.98 
Acuff-Rose was frustrated by 2 Live Crew’s meager response to its 
discovery requests (filed with the initial complaint99), so on December 14, 
1990 (approximately six months after initially filing suit), Acuff-Rose filed 
a motion to compel production.100  Acuff-Rose claimed that it was looking 
for information relating to willful infringement, profits from the 
infringement, the use of the Orbison original, and the fair use defense.101  
                                                          
95.  Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 574 (“We granted certiorari . . . to determine whether 2 Live 
Crew’s commercial parody could be a fair use [within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 107].”) 
(emphasis added). 
 
96.  See Brief on the Merits for Respondent, Campbell III, 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292) 
(referring to the lower courts’ parody finding in qualifying language (e.g., “arguably parodied,” 
“purportedly parodies”), notwithstanding that the new work’s parody status was not at issue 
before the Court); Brief for Appellant, supra note 94; Plaintiff’s Response to the Motion to 
Dismiss, supra note 93, at 110a (No. 3:90-0524) (“Acuff-Rose does not admit and has never 
admitted that Defendants’ use is a parody under the legal definition.”). 
 
97.  Campbell I, 754 F. Supp. at 1160. 
 
98.  Plaintiff’s Response to the Motion to Dismiss, supra note 93, at 109a.  
 
99.  Plaintiff’s Response to the Motion to Dismiss, supra note 93, at 135a. 
 
100.  Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Compel, supra note 93, at 201a.  
Previously, Acuff-Rose had written to 2 Live Crew’s counsel on September 25, 1990 to express 
disappointment with defendants’ scant discovery production—“a total of 14 pages, which 
represent[ed] documents for only nine of the 85 requests for production.”  Memorandum of Law 
in Support of Motion to Compel, supra note 93, at 257a Exhibit E.  On October 19, 1990, 2 Live 
Crew’s attorney Alan Mark Turk retorted, “[T]he defendants, at this time, do not intend to 
supplement their document production.  If you feel it is necessary, then I suggest that you file [a] 
Motion to Compel.”  Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Compel, supra note 93, at 
261a Exhibit F. 
 
101.  Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Compel, supra note 93. 
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The motion to compel was never decided,102 since the district court granted 
2 Live Crew’s motion for summary judgment approximately one month 
after Acuff-Rose filed its motion to compel, finding “Pretty Woman” was a 
parody and a fair use.103 
In its opinion, the district court acknowledged that Acuff-Rose 
maintained “that a number of material issues of fact remain.”104  
Nevertheless, without mentioning a single factual issue raised by the 
plaintiff, the court declared in the immediate paragraph that no genuine 
material issues of fact remained.105  The court arrived at this conclusion 
based on the fair use standards of Harper & Row:106 “Where the district 
court has found facts sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors, an 
appellate court ‘need not remand for further factfinding . . . [but] may 
conclude as a matter of law that [the challenged use] do[es] not qualify as a 
fair use of the copyright work.’”107  In other words, the court determined 
that notwithstanding Acuff-Rose’s insistence that outstanding questions of 
material fact remained, the court would weigh the four statutory fair use 
factors on summary judgment “[b]ased on the evidence presented by the 
parties in this case, including copies of the songs, correspondence and 
affidavits.”108  The court “construe[d] the evidence and all inferences to be 
drawn from it in the light most favorable to [Acuff-Rose].”109 
B. The Sixth Circuit: Commercial Parody is Presumptively Unfair 
On appeal, Acuff-Rose asked the Sixth Circuit to review de novo the 
district court’s finding that “neither the facts nor the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from them can be disputed.”110  They also challenged the 
district court’s decision to grant summary judgment based on the standards 
                                                          
102.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 94, at 5. 
 
103.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 94, at 5.  
 
104.  Campbell I, 754 F. Supp. at 1153. 
 
105.  Id. 
 
106.  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560–69 (1985). 
 
107.  Campbell I, 754 F. Supp. at 1153 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560). 
 
108.  Id. 
 
109.  Id. 
 
110.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 94, at 11–12. 
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in Harper & Row, highlighting that, unlike in the instant case, the facts in 
Harper & Row were found after a six-day bench trial.111  2 Live Crew 
countered that summary judgment was appropriate, despite Acuff-Rose’s 
outstanding motion to compel, because “[t]he documents and information 
sought by the Appellant’s Motion to Compel did not relate to the [four 
statutory factors]” and therefore could not have influenced the trial court’s 
determination of fair use.112  In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit stated that it 
was reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo but agreed with the 
district court that no further factfinding was necessary, as no material facts 
were in dispute, pointing to the Harper & Row standard.113 
Again, this ruling was despite Acuff-Rose’s insistence that the work 
was not a parody.114  This time, instead of concentrating on whether the 
work “targeted” the Orbison original, as they had argued in the district 
court,115 the music publisher stressed that summary judgment had been 
inappropriate given the outstanding motion to compel discovery, which it 
believed would reveal information about when 2 Live Crew elected to label 
the work as a parody.116  In so doing, Acuff-Rose hoped to show that 2 
Live Crew had no parodic intention and merely argued this to evade 
negotiating a royalty.117  As before, Acuff-Rose also argued that even if the 
work was found to be a parody, it was not a fair use.118 
But then, in the last paragraph of its brief, Acuff-Rose stressed that 
the Sixth Circuit needed guidance in parody cases.119  “Acuff-Rose also 
asks that, in remanding, this Court provide instructions on the proper legal 
standards to be applied in musical parody cases in this Circuit.  Such an 
opinion would be useful not only to the court and parties in this case but 
                                                          
111.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 94, at 26. 
 
112.  Appellees’ Brief at 40, Campbell II, 972 F.2d 1429 (No. 91-6225). 
 
113.  See Campbell II, 972 F.2d at 1433–34. 
 
114.  See id. at 1439. 
 
115.  See Plaintiff’s Response to the Motion to Dismiss, supra note 93, at 109a–113a. 
 
116.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 94, at 17–19. 
 
117.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 94, at 17–19. 
 
118.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 94, at 21–43. 
 
119.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 94, at 47. 
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also to the numerous entities engaged in the music industry in this 
Circuit.”120 
Unfortunately for Acuff-Rose, the court took them up on their 
offer.121  Because a finding of no parody would end the discussion of fair 
use before it even began, the Sixth Circuit assumed the district court’s 
finding that the work was parodic.122  As the opinion pointed out, the Sixth 
Circuit (home of Nashville, “Music City USA”) had no fair use cases 
involving music until this instant case.123  Therefore, by requesting the 
court to address parody and fair use, Acuff-Rose ensured that the court 
would not come to a conclusion that would truly help them—a conclusion 
that “Pretty Woman” was not a parody to begin with. 
Still, the Sixth Circuit accepted the district court’s conclusion that the 
song’s purpose was to parody the original with “considerable reservation,” 
expressed in a lengthy footnote: “[W]e cannot discern any parody of the 
original song. . . . We cannot see any thematic relationship between the 
copyrighted song and the alleged parody.  The mere fact that both songs 
have a woman as their central theme is too tenuous a connection to be 
viewed as critical comment on the original.”124 
As noted previously, the appellate court then went on to find that the 
“blatantly commercial purpose” of “Pretty Woman” prevented it from 
being a fair use of “Oh, Pretty Woman.”125  This blatant commercial 
purpose was not based on the song’s presence on Nasty’s cleaner cousin, as 
this article posited, but rather simply because it was “on a commercially 
distributed album sold for the purpose of making a profit.”126  Thus, Acuff-
Rose won on their secondary argument that it was not a fair use, but not on 
their primary argument that a finding of parody was inappropriate on 
summary judgment here.127 
                                                          
120.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 94, at 47–48. 
 
121.  See Campbell II, 972 F.2d 1429. 
 
122.  Id. at 1435. 
 
123.  Id. 
 
124.  Id. at 1435 & n.8. 
 
125.  Id. at 1439. 
 
126.  Id. at 1436 (quoting Campbell I, 754 F. Supp. at 1154). 
 
127.  Id. at 1437. 
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2 Live Crew appealed to the Sixth Circuit for an en banc hearing, 
emphasizing that the appellate ruling was inconsistent with rulings from the 
Second and Ninth Circuits (representing entertainment capitals New York 
and Los Angeles, respectively).128  But the petition was denied,129 setting 
the stage for petition by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 
C. The Supreme Court: A Parody’s Commercial Purpose Does Not Alone 
Bar Its Fair Use 
The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari expressly limited the question 
to “[w]hether petitioners’ commercial parody was a ‘fair use’ within the 
meaning of 17 U.S.C. Section 107.”130  The narrow issue put Acuff-Rose’s 
attorneys in the difficult position of saying that the work “arguably”131 or 
“purportedly”132 parodies the Orbison original while at the same time trying 
to introduce doubt about its status as a parody.133  A telling example can be 
seen in a proffered slippery slope argument: “the definition of ‘parody’ is 
malleable and could be applied to virtually every humorous modification of 
a copyrighted work.  The exclusive focus on ‘parody’ thus could open the 
door to piracy.”134 
Oral arguments were even trickier.  Sidney Rosdeitcher, counsel for 
Acuff-Rose, had a revealing exchange with one of the Justices: 
 
MR. ROSDEITCHER: They took my client’s music, partly for 
parody, let’s assume that.  I will—if you want me, I can talk 
about the definition of parody. 
 
QUESTION: Well, we do have—we do take this case on the 
assumption on [sic] that there was a parody. 
 
                                                          
128.  Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1–2, Campbell II, 972 F.2d 1429 (No. 91-6225). 
 
129.  Order at 376a app. EE, Campbell II, 972 F.2d 1429 (No. 91-6225) (denying petition 
for rehearing en banc). 
 
130.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 507 U.S. 1003 (1993) (granting certiorari). 
 
131.  Brief on the Merits for Respondent, supra note 96, at i. 
 
132.  Brief on the Merits for Respondent, supra note 96, at 2. 
 
133.  Brief on the Merits for Respondent, supra note 96, at 8–10. 
 
134.  Brief on the Merits for Respondent, supra note 96, at 9. 
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MR. ROSDEITCHER: And I’m accepting that. 
 
QUESTION: You dispute that.  But I think as it comes to us, 
we’re not getting into that.  Is that right? 
 
MR. ROSDEITCHER: I want to leave with that, yes, Your 
Honor.135 
 
As this exchange demonstrates, Acuff-Rose would have liked to talk 
about the definition of parody but was hamstrung by the narrow issue 
before the Court in its grant of certiorari.  Nevertheless, the Court elected to 
spend considerable space in its decision discussing why “Pretty Woman” 
was a parody136—an issue Acuff-Rose had been prevented from briefing 
and an issue which they felt had an incomplete factual record, owing to the 
trial court’s grant of summary judgment while they had a motion to compel 
still outstanding.137 
The Court, much like the Sixth Circuit, may itself have been 
constrained by the fact that it wanted to address the question of fair use in 
the context of parody, and could not do so if it were to short-circuit the 
analysis with a finding that “Pretty Woman” was not a parody.  
Additionally, the Court was also likely motivated by a desire to untangle 
the legal definitions of parody and satire.  As explained by one 
commentator: 
 
When Campbell came before the Supreme Court in 1993, . . . the 
terms “parody” and “satire” were still being used 
interchangeably (and somewhat confusedly) in both the Second 
and Ninth Circuits. . . . No legal distinction between the two 
terms was recognized in either circuit, and works described 
under both rubrics were regarded in both circuits as equally 
deserving of fair use protection.138 
                                                          
135.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Campbell III, 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292). 
 
136.  See Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 579–83. 
 
137.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 94, at 17–18.  Acuff-Rose made clear in their 
appellate briefs that they felt 2 Live Crew’s designation of “Pretty Woman” as a parody occurred 
after the work had already been completed and offered for sale.  
 
138.  Annemarie Bridy, Sheep in Goats’ Clothing: Satire and Fair Use After Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 257, 269 (2004). 
 
ELR - IRVIN (FINALX6) (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2016  2:02 PM 
2016] CAMPBELL v. ACUFF-ROSE ON REWIND 159 
 
Even 2 Live Crew conflated the terms in their Supreme Court brief, 
defining parody as working to “criticize, satirize, and entertain.”139 
The Court chose to differentiate parody from satire, elucidating that 
“[p]arody needs to mimic an original to make its point, . . . whereas satire 
can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act 
of borrowing.”140  In support of creating this fair use dichotomy, the Court 
offered two dictionary definitions of parody.  Both stressed imitation of the 
original author’s characteristic style in a way that ridiculed the original.141  
The Court also implied that in the instant case, the parody was clearly 
directed at the Orbison original: “A parody that more loosely targets an 
original than the parody presented here may still be sufficiently aimed at an 
original work to come within our analysis of parody.”142 
The Court’s explanation of what makes “Pretty Woman” a parody 
focused entirely on what they found as ridicule of the original and gave no 
mention of the necessary dictionary elements of imitation of the 
characteristic style of “Oh, Pretty Woman,” likely assuming that borrowing 
some music and lyrics was enough to imitate style.143  Yet “Pretty Woman” 
does not imitate the characteristic style of the Orbison original and so, by 
the Court’s own definition, is not a parody—it is merely a version in a 
different style, or in music industry parlance, a “cover” (albeit one with 
different lyrics).144  It certainly imitates the opening lyric, and it samples 
the guitar riff and other musical elements from the original, but the 
characteristic style of both its music and lyrics is that of a rap song, not a 
rock and roll song.145  Thus, the Court fell trap to the same non sequitur as 
the district court had when it defined parody with an emphasis on the 
                                                          
139.  Brief on the Merits for Petitioners at 5, Campbell III, 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292). 
 
140.  Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 580–81. 
 
141.  Id. at 580. 
 
142.  Id. at 580 n.14. 
 
143.  See id. at 579–83. 
 
144.  Compare 2 LIVE CREW, Pretty Woman, on AS CLEAN AS THEY WANNA BE 
(Skyywalker Records 1989), with ROY ORBISON, OH, PRETTY WOMAN (Monument Records 
1964). 
 
145.  Compare 2 LIVE CREW, Pretty Woman, on AS CLEAN AS THEY WANNA BE 
(Skyywalker Records 1989), with ROY ORBISON, OH, PRETTY WOMAN (Monument Records 
1964). 
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imitation of the original’s style,146 but then wrote, “The theme, content and 
style of the new version are different from the original.”147 
Justice Kennedy alone on the Court was not convinced the new work 
was a parody, perhaps for just this reason: “Almost any revamped modern 
version of a familiar composition can be construed as a ‘comment on the 
naiveté of the original,’ because of the difference in style and because it 
will be amusing to hear how the old tune sounds in the new genre.”148  Yet 
much of Kennedy’s concurrence focused on the requirement that the so-
called parody target the original, without ever explicitly mentioning the 
requirement that it imitate the style of the original.149 
While criticism of the original differentiates parody from satire, it is 
not the defining characteristic of parody.150  Certainly, the first step in any 
parody attempt must be to mimic the style of the original in a way that 
informs the audience as to what is being mocked.  For example, Lynyrd 
Skynyrd’s 1974 classic “Sweet Home Alabama” was a direct attack on Neil 
Young’s song “Southern Man.”151  Yet no one would call “Sweet Home 
Alabama” a parody of “Southern Man” since the songs lack a similarity of 
style in either music or lyrics. 
Rap’s distinct musicality is the essential difficulty in assessing the 
parodic content of most any rap song.  Rap borrows so heavily from other 
genres, yet recycles the borrowed material into a completely new style.152  
In so doing, it may comment on another work, it may borrow from another 
work, or both, but it rarely imitates the style of the work.153  What 2 Live 
                                                          
146.  Campbell I, 754 F. Supp. at 1154 n.2. 
 
147.  Id. at 1154. 
 
148.  Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 599 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 
149.  See id. at 597. 
 
150.  See id. at 588–89 (majority opinion) (“Parody presents a difficult case.  Parody’s 
humor, or in any event its comment, necessarily springs from recognizable allusion to its object 
through distorted mutilation.  Its art lies in the tension between a known original and its parodic 
twin. . . . This is not, of course, to say that anyone who calls himself a parodist can skim the 
cream and get away scot free.  In parody, . . . context is everything.”). 
 
151.  See generally Lynyrd Skynyrd and Neil Young, THRASHER’S WHEAT, 
http://thrasherswheat.org/jammin/lynyrd.htm [http://perma.cc/YHQ3-YKAU] (discussing the 
controversies surrounding Skynyrd’s “Sweet Home Alabama” and Young’s “Southern Man”). 
 
152.  See Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 589 (“It is significant that 2 Live Crew not only copied 
the first line of the original, but thereafter departed markedly from the Orbison lyrics for its own 
ends.”). 
 
153.  See id. 
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Crew did in borrowing elements from “Oh, Pretty Woman” was actually 
more akin to appropriationist art, in which the artist recontextualizes the 
source material instead of imitating it.154  This distinction places the two 
works on equal ground, as appropriationist art does not play second fiddle 
to its source: “Whereas parody is a degraded version, dependent almost 
entirely upon its source for significance, Appropriation is, by design, the 
conceptual equal of its source.”155 
As one commentator argues, “even though judicially created 
exceptions for parody exist to allow parodists to borrow a certain amount 
of an original’s expression, these exceptions fail to protect an 
appropriationist who must replicate a much larger portion of a copyrighted 
original to convey a creative message.”156  2 Live Crew argued their work 
was a parody simply because the law had not yet caught up with 
appropriationist art (and probably still has not caught up today).157 
Viewed through this lens, 2 Live Crew’s “Pretty Woman” could be 
seen as the artistic cousin of Marcel Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q. (1919) which 
used as its basis another enormously popular pretty woman, Leonardo da 
Vinci’s Mona Lisa.158  Duchamp painted a moustache and goatee on a pre-
existing image of that icon of female beauty, and added the letters 
L.H.O.O.Q. below, which form a loose French acronym for “elle a chaud 
au cul” which translates to “she has a hot ass.”159 
Seventy years later, Luther Campbell would surely approve. 
                                                          
154.  John Carlin, Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law, 
13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103, 129 n.106 (1988) (“Appropriation . . . underscores the role of 
the artist as the manipulator or modifier of existing material, rather than as the inventor or creator 
of new forms.”). 
 
155.  Id. 
 
156.  Roxana Badin, Comment, An Appropriate(d) Place in Transformative Value: 
Appropriation Art’s Exclusion from Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 60 BROOK. L. REV. 
1653, 1669 (1995). 
 
157.  See Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 589 (remanding to evaluate, among other things, the 
amount “Pretty Woman” takes from the original, in light of the song’s parodic purpose and 
character and its transformative elements).  2 Live Crew even spawned their own parody.  2 LIVE 
JEWS, AS KOSHER AS THEY WANNA BE (Kosher Records 1990). 
 
158.  See Carlin, supra note 154, at 109. 
 
159.  Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 14 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 102 (1996). 
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V: RIFFS, ROCK AND ROLL, RAP, AND RACE: THE IRONIC ICING ON THE 
NON-PARODIC CAKE 
This song may be dull, but it’s certainly clean. 
 
–Oscar Brand, “Clean Song”160 
 
In addition to the incomplete factual record owing to summary 
judgment, the unfamiliarity with the Clean album’s commercial role as a 
market filler, and the misapprehension of what constitutes a parody, Acuff-
Rose was further hampered by the strength of Oscar Brand’s affidavit on 
behalf of 2 Live Crew, which, despite glaring factual inaccuracies and a 
reliance on racial stereotypes, was cited heavily by all three Campbell 
courts.161 
2 Live Crew scored a major coup when it got Brand to submit an 
affidavit indicating his belief that “Pretty Woman” was a parody.162  Brand 
is an accomplished musician and songwriter in his own right and is a 
founding Board member of the Songwriters Hall of Fame.163  For over sixty 
years, Brand had been the host of the WNYC radio show “The Folksong 
Festival,”164 and as stated in his affidavit, he frequently devoted entire radio 
shows to parodies and satires.165  And although his affidavit does not 
mention it, Brand has also recorded some “bawdy” songs, the subject 
matter of which would not be unfamiliar to 2 Live Crew.166 
                                                          
160.  OSCAR BRAND, Clean Song, on BAWDY SONGS AND BACKROOM BALLADS VOL. 5 
(Audio Fidelity 1958). 
 
161.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (Campbell III), 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell (Campbell II), 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992); Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc. v. Campbell (Campbell I), 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991). 
 
162.  See Affidavit of Oscar Brand at 30a, Campbell I, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (No. 3:90-
0524). 
 
163.  See Affidavit of Oscar Brand, supra note 162, at 30a–31a; Oscar Brand’s Folksong 




164.  Oscar Brand Celebrates 60 Years on the Air, BMI (Jan. 31, 2006), 
http://www.bmi.com/news/entry/334671[http://perma.cc/7CRR-BXRX]. 
 
165. Affidavit of Oscar Brand, supra note 162, at 31a. 
 
166.  IRWIN STAMBLER & GRELUN LANDON, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOLK, COUNTRY & 
WESTERN MUSIC 67–68 (St. Martin’s Press, 2d ed. 1984) (1969); see, e.g., OSCAR BRAND, X 
(Roulette Records 1976). 
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Brand’s resume was stellar, but key elements of his descriptions of 
the works in his affidavit show his unfamiliarity with both rock and rap 
idioms.167  Perhaps of consequence was his age—Brand was seventy years 
old at the time of the affidavit.168  Brand’s descriptions formed the basis for 
much of the discussion by the various courts, indicating that the courts 
were relying more on his characterizations of the music than their own ears 
(or more importantly, the ears of their younger law clerks, who presumably 
had greater familiarity with rock and rap).169 
A. Brand on Rock 
Brand describes the Orbison work as opening with a drum beat 
followed by a “bass riff.”  This is incorrect; it is not a bass riff, but a guitar 
riff—the bass comes in three measures later, doubling the guitar riff.170  
Acuff-Rose’s expert, Earl v. Spielman, identified the riff as a “guitar 
lick,”171 and attorneys for Acuff-Rose correctly identified it as a “guitar 
riff” in their Supreme Court briefs172 and oral argument.173  Nevertheless, 
the term “bass riff” was adopted by both the district court and Supreme 
Court,174 indicating the weight that Brand’s testimony carried.  The Sixth 
Circuit majority, the only court to question whether the work was even a 
parody in the first place, had enough musical sense to clarify this by 
quoting Brand but then characterizing the sound as a “bass or guitar riff.”175 
                                                          
167.  See STAMBLER & LANDON, supra note 166, at 68 (“[Brand] made hundreds of 
recordings in a career that extended from the late 1940s into the 1970s.  Most of those were of 
traditional folk songs . . . .”). 
 
168.  See id. at 67. 
 
169.  See Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 589 n.19; Campbell II, 972 F.2d at 1432–33; Campbell 
I, 754 F. Supp. at 1154–55, 1158. 
 
170.  See ROY ORBISON, OH, PRETTY WOMAN (Monument Records 1964). 
 
171.  Declaration of Earl V. Spielman at 140a, Campbell I, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (No. 3:90-
0524). 
 
172.  Brief on the Merits for Respondent at 2, Campbell III, 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292). 
 
173.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Campbell III, 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292). 
 
174.  Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 570, 588–89; Campbell I, 754 F. Supp. at 1155. 
 
175.  Campbell II, 972 F.2d at 1438. 
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B. Brand on Rap 
Brand’s knowledge of rap is even more limited.  Discussing the 2 
Live Crew recording, he said the introductory drums and riff are “followed 
by an atypical scraper—a Latin musical device, quite antithetic to the 
Orbison musical styling.”176  What Brand had heard is in fact turntable 
scratching, one of the absolute hallmarks of rap music.177  Brand may be 
confusing the turntable scratching with a güiro, a Latin percussive 
instrument played by running a drumstick across a ridged gourd,178 but the 
two sound quite dissimilar.  Scratching originated in the Bronx house 
parties that gave birth to rap179 and, contrary to Brand’s assertion, is 
unrelated to Latin music.180  But even if it had been a Latin musical 
element, it would not be foreign to the Orbison oeuvre, combining as he did 
many disparate influences, including Latin music.181 
Again, Brand’s incorrect characterization of the turntable scratching 
as a “scraper” is picked up by the Supreme Court,182 even though Acuff-
Rose explains in its brief that this “scraper” is in fact turntable 
scratching.183  This ignorance of rap’s musical conventions has not seemed 
to bother many legal scholars—a search of Westlaw reveals only one law 
review article that correctly identifies the “scraper sounds” as turntable 
scratching.184 (It is worth noting, however, that the district court’s mention 
                                                          
176.  Affidavit of Oscar Brand, supra note 162, at 32a. 
 
177.  See Brett I. Kaplicer, Note, Rap Music and De Minimis Copying: Applying the 
Ringgold and Sandoval Approach to Digital Samples, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 227, 227 
(2000); Jason H. Marcus, Note, Don’t Stop That Funky Beat: The Essentiality of Digital Sampling 
to Rap Music, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 767, 770 (1991). 
 
178.  See generally Güiro, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guiro 
[http://perma.cc/M5PA-4DRU]; Güiro, MUSIC OF PUERTO RICO, 
http://www.musicofpuertorico.com/index.php/instruments/guiro/ [http://perma.cc/2CGS-LH3Z]. 
 
179.  See Kaplicer, supra note 177; Marcus, supra note 177, at 769. 
 
180.  Affidavit of Oscar Brand, supra note 162, at 32a. 
 
181.  See Ken Emerson, Roy Orbison, in THE ROLLING STONE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF 
ROCK & ROLL 129, 130 (Jim Miller ed., Rolling Stone Press 1980) (1976). 
 
182.  Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 589; Campbell I, 754 F. Supp. at 1155. 
 
183.  Brief on the Merits for Respondent, supra note 172, at 27. 
 
184.  Alan Korn, Comment, Renaming That Tune: Aural Collage, Parody and Fair Use, 
22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 321, 360 n.217 (1992).  The Westlaw search was conducted in 
March 2016. 
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of the scraper comes in the discussion of the song’s parodic elements, and 
therefore it may amount to a finding of fact—regardless of how musically 
incorrect it is. 
Admittedly, rap was a relative newcomer to the pop music scene 
when the Court took the case in 1993 (the first rap song to top the Billboard 
singles charts had only occurred in 1990185), but the Court demonstrates a 
profound misunderstanding of the genre.  This misunderstanding is most 
evident when Justice Souter quotes Justice Holmes from a copyright case 
decided ninety years prior: 
 
[I]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only 
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a 
work], outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.  At the 
one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss 
appreciation.  Their very novelty would make them repulsive 
until the public had learned the new language in which their 
author spoke.186 
 
But what the Supreme Court missed here was not the genius, but the 
conventionality.  In finding the work parodic, the Court was in fact judging 
the work’s worth, demeaning it by valuing it only to the extent that it was 
an attack on another work, not as a work that stands on its own.187  To their 
ears, the odd percussive elements, the laughter, and the off-key singing 
likely made it sound like a Spike Jones novelty record from the 1940s.188 
To their credit, the Supreme Court’s opinion managed to steer away 
from another issue that 2 Live Crew urged, which both informed and 
distorted the affidavit of Oscar Brand: race. 
                                                          
185.  See JOEL WHITBURN, JOEL WHITBURN PRESENTS THE BILLBOARD HOT 100 
CHARTS: THE NINETIES (Record Research Inc. 2000) (listing that Vanilla Ice’s “Ice Ice Baby” hit 
#1 on the Billboard Hot 100 Singles chart the week of November 3, 1990). 
 
186.  Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 582–83 (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing 
Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)). 
 
187.  See id. 
 
188.  See generally Spike Jones, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spike_Jones 
[http://perma.cc/7A2D-HWXJ]; SPIKE JONES, http://www.spikejones.com/ 
[http://perma.cc/676A-FNXS]. 
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C. Brand on Race 
Brand’s affidavit stressed the importance of race in both appreciating 
the separate markets for the two recordings and in understanding the 
parodic nature of the work.189  Brand stated, “There is no question in my 
mind that the song ‘Oh, Pretty Woman’ by Roy Orbison and William Dees 
was intended for Mr. Orbison’s country music audience and middle-
America.”190  But as Orbison’s biographer Peter Lehman recounts, when 
“Oh, Pretty Woman” was released in 1964, “Orbison had no country 
audience at that time, the song did not place on the country charts, and his 
records were not stocked in the country racks of music stores.”191  Thus, the 
terms “country music” and “middle-America” are essentially code for 
“white.”192 
Brand continued, “On the other hand, 2 Live Crew’s version[] . . . is 
aimed at the large black populace which used to buy what was once called 
‘race’ records.  The group’s popularity is intense among the disaffected, 
definitely not the audience for the Orbison song.”193  Yet Luther Campbell 
himself had said in 1990 that 2 Live Crew had “crossed over” into the 
white market: “Nobody gave a (bleep) when we were just selling music in 
the ghetto, but all of a sudden white people are buying it and everybody 
goes (bleeping) crazy.”194 
The argument of separate audiences divided by race appeared to carry 
considerable weight with dissenting Judge Nelson in the Sixth Circuit,195 so 
accordingly, 2 Live Crew’s briefs to the Supreme Court made it explicit: 
“The parody created by the Petitioners was intended for a specific 
audience, young urban blacks.  The purpose of the parody was to mock the 
banality of white centered rock-n-roll music by attacking one of its time 
                                                          
189.  Affidavit of Oscar Brand, supra note 162, at 35a. 
 
190.  Affidavit of Oscar Brand, supra note 162, at 35a. 
 
191.  PETER LEHMAN, ROY ORBISON: THE INVENTION OF AN ALTERNATIVE ROCK 
MASCULINITY 147 (Temple Univ. Press 2003). 
 
192.  Compare id., with Affidavit of Oscar Brand, supra note 162, at 35a. 
 
193.  Affidavit of Oscar Brand, supra note 162, at 35a. 
 
194.  Maya Bell, ‘I’m Here To Make Money’ Raunch = Profits for 2 Live Crew’s Luke 
Skyywalker, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 8, 1990, at E1. 
 
195.  Campbell II, 972 F.2d at 1445 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
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honored ballads.  The intended market for the parody was as different from 
that of the copyrighted work as black and white.”196 
In contrast, Acuff-Rose’s Supreme Court briefs attempted to steer the 
debate away from race.197  “The suggestion here, that music is either for 
‘whites’ or ‘blacks’ and that petitioners’ recording or respondent’s potential 
market is confined to only one of these audiences, is simply wrong.”198  
Interestingly, Acuff-Rose did not back up this statement with facts that 
should have been available to them as Orbison’s publisher.  For example, 
versions of “Oh, Pretty Woman” were recorded by at least two major black 
artists: the Count Basie Orchestra in 1965 and Al Green in 1972.199  Nor 
was Orbison’s music unfamiliar to black audiences: Orbison had five 
crossover hits on the R&B charts in his peak Monument Records period of 
1960 to 1964: “Only the Lonely,” “Blue Angel,” “In Dreams,” “Mean 
Woman Blues,” and “Blue Bayou.”200 
Toward the end of their brief, Acuff-Rose attacked 2 Live Crew for 
their attempt to limit the musical audiences by race: 
 
Moreover, petitioners offer no basis for their stereotyped view of 
the supposed audiences for the Orbison song or the 2 Live Crew 
version.  American popular music knows no ethnic, cultural, 
class, or even national boundaries.  Indeed, one of the great well 
springs of creativity in American popular music is the cross-
fertilization of music from different cultures, to cite the history 
of jazz and rock and roll as two obvious examples.  Elvis 
Presley, a southern white, revolutionized “white” musical tastes 
by drawing on sources that originated in African-American 
culture.  Rap itself has a wide audience among whites as well as 
blacks. . . . American popular music is a multicultural blend and 
arguments, such as petitioners’, that seek to confine the appeal 
of songs to one ethnic audience or another are wholly 
unfounded.201 
                                                          
196.  Brief on the Merits for Petitioners at 34, Campbell III, 510 U.S. 569 (No. 92-1292). 
 
197.  Brief on the Merits for Respondent, supra note 172, at 10. 
 
198.  Brief on the Merits for Respondent, supra note 172, at 10. 
 
199.  LEHMAN, supra note 191, at 148. 
 
200.  Id. at 191–92. 
 
201.  Brief on the Merits for Respondent, supra note 172, at 41–42. 
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Brand’s affidavit also insisted that the issue of race was important to 
understanding the parody, because 2 Live Crew was “trying to show how 
bland and banal the Orbison song seems to them.  It’s just one of many 
examples of their derisive approach to ‘white-centered’ popular music.”202  
Judge Nelson embraced this view in his Sixth Circuit dissent: “The parody 
(done in an African-American dialect) was clearly intended to ridicule the 
white-bread original.”203  The phrase “white-bread” comes from Brand’s 
affidavit, describing the historical targets of black musical parody.204  
Justice Souter referred to the phrase in his Supreme Court opinion as 
well.205 
Though the rest of the appellate panel did not share Judge Nelson’s 
view of the racial undertones of the case, at least one legal scholar agreed: 
“The majority’s failure to appreciate that defendant’s work was poking fun 
at the original is difficult to understand, and suggests at a minimum severe 
cultural myopia.”206  But there is only a “cultural myopia” if one believes 
that moving a work into a different genre instantly “parodizes” it.  To the 
contrary, it is culturally myopic to suggest that it does create parody to 
present it as a rap—to imply that a rap version always mocks the original is 
to devalue rap as an art form and reserve it for only comic relief.  
Furthermore, it patronizes rap musicians to imply that their cultural 
contributions are limited to being jokesters and essentially relegates them 
to the role of participants in a minstrel show. 
The irony, of course, is that this was exactly the rappers’ argument in 
this case.207  After the Supreme Court’s decision, Luther Campbell himself 
said, “As a black man in this country, I felt that the system never worked 
for me.  Now I really feel it does.”208  Campbell’s attorney Bruce Rogow 
had no illusions about what drove the case: “Money, race, rock and roll, 
                                                          
202.  Affidavit of Oscar Brand, supra note 162, at 34a. 
 
203.  Campbell II, 972 F.2d at 1442. 
 
204.  Affidavit of Oscar Brand, supra note 162, at 34a. 
 
205.  Campbell III, 510 U.S. at 582. 
 
206.  WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 196 (2d ed. 
1995). 
 
207.  See generally Brief on the Merits for Respondent, supra note 172. 
 
208.  Aaron Epstein, A Rap Ruling: Parody is Protected, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 8, 1994, 
at A1. 
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law, and ego were the elements that made Campbell v. Acuff-Rose fun to 
litigate.”209 
VI: IF THAT’S THE WAY IT MUST BE, OKAY: A FAMOUS CASE IS BORN 
I think maybe if I made a contribution to the music scene, the 
music business—some form of a contribution that maybe 
brought a little happiness to someone or held a few things 




The greatest irony of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, however, is its very 
existence as the definitive fair use parody case (at least for the time being).  
That a recording with arguably no parodic purpose—but a heightened 
commercial purpose—should be at the center of the case that established 
broad protections for parodic fair use is remarkable, to say the least.  When 
Acuff-Rose launched its simple copyright infringement suit, it likely did 
not think it was a “hard case.”  Yet that is what it became, due to a perfect 
storm of musical and cultural ignorance on the part of most everyone 
involved. 
As this article has attempted to show, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose is a 
case that probably should have come out very differently in each of the 
courts that heard it.  And yet, contrary to the old legal saying that “hard 
cases make bad law,” the law announced by Campbell is one that protects 
artistic freedom by recognizing that artists must borrow, and some artists 
must borrow considerable amounts—ultimately a very good outcome.  As 
Justice Scalia, who was on the Court when it heard the case, once wrote, 
“Famous old cases are famous, you see, not because they came out right, 
but because the rule of law they announced was the intelligent one.”211 
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